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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 20, 2018, former Hong Kong-based publisher Gui 
Minhai was forcibly removed from a train to Beijing.1 Gui, a Swedish 
citizen, had been traveling with two Swedish diplomatic officials, 
 
* Executive Director, Georgetown Center for Asian Law. The author would like to thank 
Jerry Cohen, John Kamm, and John Quigley for their excellent comments on an earlier draft of 
this Article. Any errors remain my own. 
1. Chris Buckley, Chinese Police Seize Publisher From Train in Front of Diplomats, N. Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/asia/china-police-
bookseller-train-gui-minhai.html.   
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including the Swedish Shanghai counsul general, and was scheduled to 
visit with a doctor at the Swedish embassy after his arrival in Beijing.2 
Instead, Gui, who was kidnapped from his apartment in Pattaya, 
Thailand in October 2015, was “disappeared” for a second time.3 When 
the train pulled into the station in Jinan, Shandong, plainclothes agents 
boarded the train, found Gui, and removed him.4 The agents refused to 
identify themselves and said nothing about the grounds for Gui’s 
arrest.5 For days following his renewed detention, Chinese authorities 
refused to confirm his whereabouts, and urgent pleas from family 
members and from the Swedish government to guarantee his safety 
went unanswered.6 
Beijing’s interest in Gui stemmed from his work as a publisher 
and sometime author of salacious and often thinly-sourced books on 
China’s political elite.7 Any public discussion of the rivalries and 
private lives of top Communist Party leaders is strictly prohibited 
inside China, which gave Gui and other publishers an opening. His 
now-defunct Hong Kong-based publishing house, Mighty Current, 
targeted mainland Chinese citizens passing through Hong Kong who 
were hungry to learn more about the goings-on inside the black box of 
Zhongnanhai, the home of China’s top leaders.8 
Two years into his ordeal, Gui probably thought that his case had 
turned a corner: he was released from custody in October 2017 and was 
reportedly living in an apartment in Ningbo in China’s coastal Zhejiang 
province.9 Although his freedom was deeply circumscribed, he was 
allowed to visit with Swedish consular officials in Shanghai and spoke 
 
2. Tom Phillips, ‘A Very Scary Movie’: How China Snatched Gui Minhai on the 11.10 
Train to Beijing, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2018, 10:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/feb/22/how-china-snatched-gui-minhai-train-beijing-bookseller-hong-kong 
[https://perma.cc/S545-VZ5Q]. 
3. Euan McKirdy & Steven Jiang, China confirms swedish publisher Gui Minhai has been 
detained, CNN (Feb. 6, 2018, 3:13 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/06/asia/gui-minhai-
china-detention-confirmed-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/2AHX-3VRX].  
4. Id.  
5. Phillips, supra note 2.  
6. Id.  
7. Alex W. Palmer, The Case of Hong Kong’s Missing Booksellers, N. Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/magazine/the-case-of-hong-kongs-
missing-booksellers.html.  
8. Id.  
9. Interview (June 2018). Virtually all interviewees were granted anonymity for this 
Article, allowing them to speak more freely about matters that are considered politically 
sensitive in China. Where identifying information is supplied, no such anonymity was requested 
or given. 
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regularly over Skype with his UK-based daughter, Angela.10 After his 
release, Gui began to present symptoms of the debilitating neurological 
disorder amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, also known as A.L.S., which in 
turn led to his now-aborted medical appointment at the Swedish 
Embassy in Beijing.11  
Gui’s case is an important one. Over the more than two years since 
Gui’s initial abduction from Thailand, his case has strained China-
Sweden relations, although some have criticized Stockholm’s 
unwillingness take stronger measures against Beijing.12 The case has 
also impacted China’s relationship with the European Union.13 On 
February 22, 2018, thirty-seven Members of the European Parliament 
wrote to Chinese President Xi Jinping to demand Gui’s immediate and 
unconditional release, the latest of several interventions by the 
European Union on Gui’s behalf.14 
International efforts on Gui’s case are worthy of note. They come 
at a time when some Western states have been more reluctant to raise 
human rights concerns with Beijing, for fear of damaging economic 
ties with the world’s second-largest economy.15 That said, perhaps the 
most important international ramifications of Gui’s case are not 
diplomatic, but legal. Under international law, the Chinese government 
is required to inform a detained foreign national of his rights to consular 
notification and visitation. If the detainee so requests, then the Chinese 
government is obligated to notify the detainee’s home government of 
the detention. In addition, China is also obligated to provide diplomatic 
officials regular and unfettered access to detained foreign nationals, 
 
10. Id.  
11. Buckley, supra note 1.  
12. See Jojje Olsson, Ignore China’s economic muscle and condemn it for kidnapping Gui 
Minhai, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018, 10:07 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/25/sweden-ignore-chinas-economic-
muscle-condemn-kidnapping-gui-minhai [https://perma.cc/84VX-7ZVE].  
13. See Catherine Lai, EU efforts to free detained bookseller Gui Minhai to be doubled – 
not abandoned – after ‘interview,’ MPs say, H.K. FREE PRESS (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:39 PM), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/02/23/eu-efforts-free-detained-bookseller-gui-minhai-
doubled-not-abandoned-interview-mps-say/ [https://perma.cc/F7DY-3Z7Q].  
14. See Phila Siu & Kimmy Chung, 37 EU politicians demand Beijing ‘unconditionally’ 
release Hong Kong bookseller Gui Minhai, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 23, 2018), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2134511/37-eu-politicians-demand-
beijing-unconditionally-release [https://perma.cc/6DW3-V73R]. 
15.  See Nektaria Stamouli & William Wilkes, Chinese Cash Blunts Europe’s Criticism of 
Beijing’s Human-Rights Record, WALL STREET J. (June 19, 2017, 1:06 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-cash-blunts-europes-criticism-of-beijings-human-rights-
record-1497892018 [https://perma.cc/A6JM-GZXZ] (illustrating this troubling dynamic). 
1218 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:5 
and to allow those diplomatic officials to offer basic forms of support 
to their nationals as they prepare for possible criminal prosecution.16 
Gui’s rights under international law – as well as Sweden’s legal 
rights – were repeatedly violated over the course of Gui’s lengthy 
ordeal.17 As of this writing, Gui remains in detention, and may be 
prosecuted for allegedly trafficking in state secrets.18 If that 
prosecution moves forward, Gui would almost certainly face a lengthy 
criminal sentence. In other words, if Gui is convicted, he may not be 
able to return to Sweden for several years, if ever. 
In this Article, I argue that the violation of both Gui’s and 
Sweden’s rights under international law is consequential: the handling 
of his case, and its denouement, were shaped in important ways by his 
lack of contact with Swedish diplomatic officials. If Gui had been given 
timely access to consular officials, it is possible that the case would 
have turned out differently. Indeed, it seems likely that Chinese 
officials in charge of Gui’s case blocked his access to Swedish consular 
officials precisely so that he would become more cooperative, and so 
that they could achieve their desired outcome. In other words, the 
denial of consular access to Gui was no accident. Instead, it was part of 
China’s larger strategy for dealing with him. 
I further argue that Gui’s case is part of a small but growing 
pattern of violations of consular access by China in cases that could be 
deemed political. Gui Minhai’s Mighty Current colleague, Lee Bo, a 
British citizen, was “disappeared” from Hong Kong and taken over the 
border into mainland China in December 2015.19 And yet the UK 
government was neither informed of his whereabouts in a timely 
manner, nor given access to Lee during his time in detention.20 Gui’s 
 
16. See LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 139-185 (2008) 
(containing a broad overview of China’s notification and access obligations under international 
law).  
17. Gui’s rights under domestic Chinese law were also violated, including his rights to 
legal counsel and to a fair trial under Chinese criminal procedure law. See Thomas E. Kellogg, 
The Strange and Sad Case of Gui Minhai,  THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-strange-and-sad-case-of-gui-minhai/ [https://perma.cc/
5FKA-HR7U]. These concerns are very much worthy of note, but sadly a full discussion on this 
point is beyond the scope of this article. 
18. Interview (June 2018).  
19. See Michael Forsythe, Disappearance of 5 Tied to Publisher Prompts Broader Worries 
in Hong Kong, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/world/asia/
mighty-current-media-hong-kong-lee-bo.html.  
20.  In a television interview in March 2016, Lee denied that he had been detained, instead 
suggesting that he had voluntarily returned to the mainland to assist with the investigation of 
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fellow Swedish citizen, rights activist Peter Dahlin, was denied access 
to consular officials for thirteen days after he was detained in January 
2016.21 Dahlin’s captors acknowledged his right to meet with consular 
officials, but falsely claimed the right to delay this meeting for as long 
as they deemed necessary.22 And geologist Xue Feng, a United States 
citizen, was denied access to US consular officials for a full three weeks 
after his 2007 detention, for allegedly stealing state secrets.23 
Finally, I also argue in this piece that China may be developing 
new methodologies for skirting its consular notification and visitation 
obligations under international law. In particular, in some key political 
cases, Chinese state security agents may be pressuring detained foreign 
nationals to forego their consular visitation rights, thus making it that 
much more difficult for diplomatic officials to gain access and to offer 
assistance. (Individuals detained overseas do have the right to decline 
consular visits, although most individuals will unsurprisingly take full 
advantage of consular support.)24 Given what is publicly known about 
China’s handling of the case, it seems likely that Gui Minhai and Lee 
 
Gui’s case. In that same interview, Lee also disclaimed his UK citizenship, in what may have 
been an effort by the Chinese government to void his consular visitation rights. To many 
observers, it seemed highly likely that Lee’s statements had been coerced. See Hong Kong 
bookseller Lee Bo says he will abandon UK residency, BBC (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35693759 [https://perma.cc/9M9E-4CD8]. 
21. See Michael Caster, Chapter 5: Enhanced Interrogation, in PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
THE DISAPPEARED (2017) (describing Dahlin’s firsthand account of his time in detention); see 
also Tom Phillips, A human rights activist, a secret prison and a tale from Xi Jinping’s new 
China, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/03/
human-rights-activist-peter-dahlin-secret-black-prison-xi-jinpings-new-china 
[https://perma.cc/9GTK-PRQR]. 
22. See Caster, supra note 21, at 73. Dahlin notes that Chinese officials told him, “I had 
the right to ask for a lawyer, but I did not have the right to receive a lawyer. I had the right to 
meet with Embassy personnel, but the authorities could make me wait as long as they wanted 
before allowing me to meet anyone from my Embassy.” Id. This statement represents a distortion 
of China’s obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, see Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr.  24, 1963. 
23. Quiet Fight to Free American in China Jail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Nov. 19, 2009, 9:59 
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/quiet-fight-to-free-american-in-china-jail/ 
[https://perma.cc/8RTY-CJ67]. Other sources put the delayed notification and access at a full 32 
days. See Richard Bernstein, Beijing’s Bluster, America’s Quiet: The Disturbing Case of Xue 
Feng, N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 2010, 8:45 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2010/10/06/
disturbing-case-xue-feng [https://perma.cc/C3LQ-C2AW]. After the initial delay, US officials 
were able to visit regularly with Xue but were not allowed to attend his 2010 trial. Xue was 
eventually released in April 2015 and returned to the United States after serving more than seven 
years in jail. 
24. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 22, art. 36(1)(c).  
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Bo were both successfully pressured to disclaim their consular 
visitation rights, and to self-identify as Chinese nationals. 
If so, the Gui and Lee cases represent a disturbing development: 
though several states – including, at times, the United States – have 
failed to properly execute consular notification, or have blocked 
consular access, no other state has successfully pressed foreign 
nationals to openly and publicly disclaim their consular visitation 
rights, or to renounce their foreign citizenship.25 The Chinese 
government’s handling of the Gui and Lee cases raises the concern that 
other states might learn from China’s example, and adopt similar 
approaches in politically sensitive cases in their own countries. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I offer a brief 
summary of the Gui Minhai case, focusing in particular on violations 
of his right to consular access under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (“VCCR”). In Part II, I offer a brief overview of 
Article 36 of the VCCR and put forward a legal analysis of China’s 
general approach to consular visitation. I highlight both the fact that 
China seems to largely adhere to its obligations in most cases, and that 
it has failed to do so in a small but growing number of cases that have 
significant political overtones. In Part III, I conclude, placing China’s 
flouting of the VCCR in the context of its approach to international law 
more generally in the Xi Jinping years. 
II. THE GUI MINHAI CASE: THE BOOKSELLER VANISHES 
It is impossible to do justice to the complexity and the sheer 
strangeness of the Gui case in this short Article. This short summary of 
the case attempts to give a general overview, with particular attention 
to Gui’s access – or lack thereof – to Swedish consular officials during 
his more than two years in detention. I also ask questions about the 
political calculus behind Gui’s initial detention, as well as his second 
detention in January 2018. 
 
25. An extensive review of the scholarly record turned up no similar cases from other parts 
of the world. Interviews with experts also failed to turn up any known incidents of this practice 
from other jurisdictions. 
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A. Background to the Gui Case  
The story of Gui’s kidnapping, and his long-term detention inside 
China, begins in October 2015.26  At that time, Gui was working away 
at his luxury apartment in Pattaya, Thailand.27 On October 17, Gui was 
visited at his home by a Chinese-speaking man.28 The two of them left 
Gui’s apartment complex together in Gui’s car, after which point Gui 
disappeared.29 His whereabouts would remain unknown for a full three 
months.30 
In addition to Gui, four other individuals working for Mighty 
Current were also detained. On December 30, Gui’s colleague Lee Bo 
was disappeared from Hong Kong.31 Lee, a British passport holder, 
later emerged on the Mainland and claimed that he had returned to 
China voluntarily to assist in the official investigation into Mighty 
Current.32 Lee was denied access to British consular officials while in 
detention, and he later publicly disclaimed his British citizenship.33 To 
its credit, the UK government asked Beijing for more information on 
Lee’s whereabouts within days of his disappearance.34 
Though it is beyond the scope of this Article, Lee’s apparent 
abduction from Hong Kong by Mainland Chinese authorities is a 
violation of Article 22 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-
constitution.35 Article 22 forbids mainland authorities from operating 
 
26.  Oliver Holmes & Tom Phillips, Gui Minhai: the strange disappearance of a publisher 
who riled China’s elite, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/dec/08/gui-minhai-the-strange-disappearance-of-a-publisher-who-riled-chinas-
elite [https://perma.cc/TV3F-KA9C].  
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
30. Missing Hong Kong publisher Gui Minhai paraded on China TV, BBC (Jan. 18, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35338484 [https://perma.cc/7KVN-UREQ].   
31. Forsythe, supra note 19.  
32. Austin Ramzy, Hong Kong Bookseller Returns from Mainland China, Denying He Was 
Abducted, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/asia/hong-
kong-bookseller-lee-bo.html.  
33. ‘Missing’ Hong Kong bookseller Lee Bo says he will give up British citizenship, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 29, 2016, 6:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/
missing-british-bookseller-appears-on-television [https://perma.cc/37RT-3RP2].  
34. UK asks China what it knows of missing Hong Kong Briton, BBC (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35233791 [https://perma.cc/7KMJ-GABM]. 
35. See PEN AMERICA, WRITING ON THE WALL: DISAPPEARED BOOKSELLERS AND FREE 
EXPRESSION IN HONG KONG, 43 (2016). 
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in Hong Kong without the approval of both the SAR government and 
the central government in Beijing.36 
The other three Mighty Current workers, Lui Por, Cheung Chi-
ping, and Lam Wing-kee, were detained in Shenzhen and Dongguan in 
October 2015.37 Since none of them hold foreign passports, their cases 
do not raise any VCCR concerns. Still, their cases raise very real 
questions about the rights of the accused under domestic Chinese 
criminal law. 
Widespread speculation that Gui had in fact been spirited back to 
mainland China was confirmed in January 2016. On January 17, Gui 
appeared on China Central Television (“CCTV”), stating that he had 
voluntarily returned to China and had turned himself over to Chinese 
authorities.38 He had done so, he said, because he wanted to face justice 
over an alleged drunk driving incident that took place in 2003.39 
In that same interview, Gui also asked others to respect his 
decision to return to China. He explicitly declined any potential 
assistance from outside actors in his case. “I do not want any individual 
or organization, including Sweden, to involve themselves in, or 
interfere with, my return to China,” Gui said.40 
In an interesting parallel with other cases of detained foreign 
nationals who are ethnically Chinese, Gui also suggested that he 
viewed himself not as Swedish, but as Chinese.41 Gui said, “Even 
though I am a Swedish national, I truly feel that I am still Chinese, and 
my roots are still in China. So I hope that the Swedish side would 
respect my personal choice, rights, and privacy, and let me solve my 
own problems.”42 
Gui’s statements in the interview are worthy of note for several 
reasons. First, Gui’s explanation for his return to China, and his 
suggestion that it was voluntary, seemed to be coerced. According to 
 
36. Hong Kong Basic Law, art. 22(1).  
37. See id. at 11 (containing a comprehensive timeline of the disappearances of the five 
Mighty Current employees).  
38. Tom Phillips, Missing Hong Kong bookseller ‘confesses’ on Chinese state TV, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/17/missing-hong-
kong-bookseller-gui-minhai-reappears-on-chinese-tv [https://perma.cc/3QB3-DRDQ].  
39. Id.  
40. Michael Forsythe, Missing Man Back in China, Confessing to Fatal Crime, N. Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/world/asia/missing-man-back-in-
china-confessing-to-fatal-crime.html. 
41. Id.  
42. Id.  
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Gui’s daughter Angela, Gui had never mentioned any such drunk 
driving incident, and in the weeks leading up to his disappearance, gave 
no indication that he planned to return to China.43 Indeed, according to 
those close to him, Gui knew that his publishing work made it much 
too dangerous for him to return to China, and would never have done 
so on his own accord.44 Given the facts of the case, it seems clear that 
Gui was pressured by Chinese authorities to lie about the circumstances 
surrounding his return to China, and his ongoing detention. 
Equally troubling, Gui also seems to have been pressed to publicly 
disclaim any assistance from Sweden, despite his right to consular 
assistance under international law. As noted above, if Gui was in fact 
pushed by Chinese authorities to publicly disavow his consular 
assistance rights under Article 36 of the VCCR, then this is the first 
such case in which a state has been able to evade its VCCR 
responsibilities in this manner. 
One potential option for Beijing – to openly and formally claim 
Gui as a Chinese citizen – seems to have been closed off. According to 
Gui’s daughter Angela, Gui had formally renounced his Chinese 
citizenship years ago, making him solely a Swedish national and not a 
dual citizen of both China and Sweden.45 Still, one wonders why Gui 
was made to put forward a rationale for his return to China that seems, 
to put it mildly, rather implausible. Some exile activists believe that 
Gui’s drunk driving story was meant to send a message to other ex-
Chinese nationals living overseas, that Beijing’s long reach now 
extends well beyond its own borders, and the niceties of international 
law will not prevent Chinese authorities from taking action to retrieve 
those it perceives as troublemakers.46 If true, then the implausibility of 
Gui’s story becomes less of a liability and more of a benefit to Beijing: 
it shows that the Chinese Communist Party will not let appearances, 
such as the less-than-ideal public relations optics of Gui putting 
forward a facially preposterous story on Chinese television, get in the 
 
43. Daughter of Swedish Bookseller Says He is Illegally Held in China on Dubious 
Charges, RADIO FREE ASIA (May 25, 2016), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/daughter-
of-swedish-05252016104726.html [https://perma.cc/N2ZR-LK4C]. 
44.  Interview with one person close to Gui, who said, “He wouldn’t have travelled to the 
Mainland on his own.” 
45. Angela Gui, A call that never comes: Why I cannot remain silent after Chinese 
authorities abducted my father, H. K. FREE PRESS (Sept. 3, 2016, 9:22 AM), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/09/03/a-call-that-never-comes-why-i-cannot-remain-
silent-after-chinese-authorities-abducted-my-father/ [https://perma.cc/8YSB-LCQN]. 
46.  Interview. 
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way of its efforts to find and punish critics of the regime living 
overseas. After Gui’s first televised appearance, Beijing had to endure 
a round of press coverage of the case from outlets around the world, 
virtually all of which questioned the veracity of Gui’s story, and 
highlighted the fact that he had likely been kidnapped from Thailand 
by Chinese government agents.47  
Gui made a second television appearance just over a month after 
his first.48 On February 28, 2016, Gui was interviewed by the Hong 
Kong-based Phoenix Television, as part of a Phoenix story on the 
Mighty Current Books case.49 In that interview, Gui acknowledged that 
he had violated Chinese laws relating to book importation, shipping 
roughly 4,000 Mighty Current books into China in special packaging 
that could not be scanned.50 
After that second television appearance, Gui more or less 
disappeared from sight. Though his case was kept in the headlines, in 
part through the valiant efforts of his UK-based daughter, Angela, 
nonetheless Gui was not seen again publicly for roughly another twenty 
months.51 Where Gui was during that time is not known. Even his legal 
status during that time is unclear: there is no public record of Gui being 
tried for any crime between October 2015 and October 2017, nor did 
the Chinese government announce any final criminal charges against 
him. Though reference was made to the 2003 drunk driving case, 
nonetheless it seems that Gui remained in a form of legal limbo, unable 
 
47. For three of many such examples, see Isabella Steger, Missing Hong Kong Bookseller 
Employee Shows Up in China, WALL STREET J., (Jan. 18, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/
chinarealtime/2016/01/18/missing-hong-kong-bookseller-employee-resurfaces/ 
[https://perma.cc/X586-E2T4]; Ben Bland, Missing Hong Kong publisher confesses on China 
state TV, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2016) http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001065802/en?archive 
[https://perma.cc/8GP8-KLY2]; Emily Rauhala, Hong Kong bookseller’s televised ‘confession’ 
was absurd and incoherent – and that’s the point, WASHINGTON POST, (Jan. 18, 2016) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/18/hong-kong-booksellers-
televised-confession-was-absurd-and-incoherent-and-thats-the-point/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.a6bf91134cb9.   
48. Ned Levin, Hong Kong Booksellers Confess to Illegal Sales in China, WALL STREET 
J. (Feb. 29, 2016, 10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-booksellers-confess-to-
illegal-sales-in-china-1456747083 [https://perma.cc/7XHN-PYVY]. 
49. Id.  
50. Id.  
51. Jojje Olsson, The Gui Minhai Case Two Years On: A Daughter’s Struggle, TAIWAN 
SENTINEL (Oct. 16, 2017), https://sentinel.tw/gui-minhai-daughters-struggle/ [https://perma.cc/
HLX9-BYAU].  
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to contest his detention in any way, or to meet with a lawyer who might 
help him mount a meaningful defense.52 
It was not until October 2017, a full two years after his 
disappearance from his apartment in Pattaya, Thailand, that Swedish 
authorities received word that Gui had apparently been released.53 Yet 
he was by no means fully free: his movements were heavily 
circumscribed, and his ability to contact friends and family outside of 
China was limited.54 Gui was, however, able to make contact with 
Swedish consular officials in Shanghai, and to begin making plans to 
travel to Beijing.55 
Just a few months later, Gui was detained by Chinese authorities 
a second time, this time on a train from Shanghai to Beijing.56 
According to press reports, Chinese authorities want to investigate Gui 
again over allegations that he disclosed state secrets, which may mean 
that he is facing yet another round of incommunicado detention that 
could last for months or years.57 In June 2018, the Chinese Embassy in 
Sweden confirmed that Gui was in fact being investigated for allegedly 
disclosing state secrets. Interestingly, at the same time, the Embassy 
confirmed Gui’s Swedish citizenship.58 As of this writing, no 
additional information has emerged on Gui’s whereabouts or his legal 
status. As of July 2018, Gui has, once again, disappeared into a legal 
black hole. 
B. The Swedish Response 
To its credit, the Swedish government contacted both the Thai 
government and the Chinese government soon after learning of Gui’s 
 
52. Interview (June 2018).  
53. Tom Phillips, Bookseller Gui Minhai ‘half free’ after being detained in China for two 
years, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2017, 2:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
oct/27/bookseller-gui-minhai-half-free-detained-china [https://perma.cc/LMC5-G6N9].  
54. Id.  
55. Interview (June 2018). 
56. Buckley, supra note 1.  
57. Tom Phillips, Chinese media claims bookseller Gui Minhai offered national secrets to 
foreign groups, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2018, 9:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/feb/11/chinese-media-claims-bookseller-gui-minhai-offered-national-secrets-to-
sweden [https://perma.cc/H7TJ-N9CT].  
58. Though the statement noted that Gui has had access to “senior medical experts,” no 
reference was made to Gui’s right to consult with an attorney, a serious breach of his rights under 
Chinese law. See Chinese Embassy Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Case of Gui Minhai, 
EMBASSY OF CHINA (June 8, 2018), http://www.chinaembassy.se/eng/sgxw/t1566916.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5YZV-V495]. 
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disappearance.59 And yet Stockholm’s initial outreach to Beijing 
yielded little in terms of concrete information on Gui’s whereabouts: 
Chinese authorities initially refused to confirm that Gui was being held 
in official custody, or that he had been forcibly removed from Thailand 
by Chinese state agents.60 
On January 22, 2016, a full three months after Gui’s 
disappearance, the Swedish embassy in Beijing noted the “repeated 
denial of consular access to Mr. Gui Minhai.”61 That same day, 
Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister Margot Wallstrom condemned Gui’s 
detention and the detention of Swedish rights activist Peter Dahlin as 
“unacceptable.”62 It was not until late February, after Gui’s second 
television appearance, that Swedish diplomatic officials were given 
access to Gui.63 During their meeting, Gui indicated that he did not 
want any assistance from the Swedish government.64 
After that initial February meeting, Swedish officials were denied 
access to Gui for several months. In June 2016, Sweden’s Consul-
General to Hong Kong, Helena Storm, noted that Sweden’s ongoing 
requests for consular access had been denied.65 She further noted that 
Sweden had continued to “request answers on the legal process and any 
charges against him,” and further that Sweden expected Gui’s case “to 
be dealt with within the framework of the rule of law.”66 These public 
and private overtures yielded little in the way of additional access: it 
was not until September 2016 that Swedish consular officials were 
allowed to visit Gui a second time.67 That second visit also failed to 
lead to regular visitation rights for Sweden. 
It must be said that Sweden did make regular and repeated 
overtures – mostly in private – to Beijing to win access to Gui.68 
 
59. Holmes & Phillips, supra note 26.  
60. Interview.  
61. PEN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 15.  
62. Sweden lashes out at China’s detention of campaigners, THE LOCAL (Jan. 22, 2016, 
5:19 PM), https://www.thelocal.se/20160122/sweden-lashes-out-at-chinas-detention-of-
campaigners [https://perma.cc/B2JG-64QD]. 
63. PEN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 15.  
64. Id.  
65. Stuart Lau, Detained Causeway Bay bookseller Gui Minhai not seen by Swedish 
diplomats for more than three months, says consul general, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 
6, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1966843/detained-causeway-
bay-bookseller-gui-minhai-not-seen-swedish  [https://perma.cc/CBK9-S8GT].  
66. Id.  
67. PEN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 19.  
68. Interview. 
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Swedish diplomatic officials also urged that Gui’s rights under Chinese 
criminal law be protected, and that if no charges could be brought 
against him, he should be released.69 Still, many observers questioned 
whether Stockholm’s initial primary reliance on quiet diplomacy was 
the right choice, given Beijing’s lackluster response to Sweden’s initial 
efforts at outreach.70 Would it not have been better, the argument goes, 
for Sweden to have taken stronger public steps, once it became clear 
that diplomatic efforts conducted behind closed doors had largely 
failed? 
After Gui’s second disappearance, Swedish authorities offered a 
much stronger response. Just a day after Gui was removed from the 
bullet train to Beijing, Foreign Minister Wallstrom issued a strongly-
worded statement calling for Gui’s immediate release.71 “We take a 
very serious view of the detention on Saturday of Swedish citizen Gui 
Minhai, with no specific reason being given for the detention, which 
took place during an ongoing consular support mission,” Wallstrom 
said.72 Wallstrom also noted that China’s ambassador to Sweden had 
been summoned twice in the aftermath of Gui’s second detention.73 
In a second statement released roughly two weeks later, Foreign 
Minister Wallstrom condemned China’s “brutal” detention of Gui, and 
noted that Sweden was once again barred from engaging in consular 
visits with Gui.74 Chinese authorities responded with yet another 
seemingly coerced video featuring Gui, in which he claimed that he had 
been tricked by Swedish authorities, who were intent on 
“sensationalizing” his case.75 Once again, Gui himself had been 
 
69. Interview.  
70. See Michael Caster, The last missing bookseller: One year on, the anniversary of Gui 
Minhai’s abduction demands action, H. K. FREE PRESS (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/17/the-last-missing-bookseller-one-year-on-the-
anniversary-of-gui-minhais-abduction-demands-action/ [https://perma.cc/LZ7V-JNBL]. 
71.  Margot Wallstrom, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Statement in connection 
with the detention of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, GOV’T OFFICES OF SWEDEN (Jan. 23, 2018),  
http://www.government.se/statements/2018/01/statement-in-connection-with-the-detention-of-
swedish-citizen-gui-minhai/ [https://perma.cc/N3ZT-5YEE]. 
72. Id.  
73. Id.  
74. Tom Phillips, Sweden condemns China’s ‘brutal’ detention of bookseller Gui Minhai, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2018, 9:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/06/
sweden-condemns-chinas-brutal-detention-of-bookseller-gui-minhai [https://perma.cc/SCS8-
F4FY]. 
75. Tom Phillips, Bookseller Gui Minhai surfaces in Chinese custody to deliver staged 
confession, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2018, 9:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
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weaponized, brought into the public arena to speak out against the 
Swedish government’s efforts on his behalf. It seemed clear, yet again, 
that Gui’s statements had been coerced.  
The difference between the Swedish government’s reaction to 
Gui’s initial detention, in late 2015 and early 2016, and its reaction 
upon hearing of Gui’s second detention in January 2018, is quite 
pronounced. Other states that find themselves in a situation similar to 
Sweden might well take note: soft diplomacy efforts may fail to win 
results in politically sensitive cases, which means that states need to 
think about diplomatic responses that will increase the political cost to 
Beijing for failing to adhere to its VCCR obligations. Failure to develop 
stronger diplomatic tools may prove costly: given the relative success 
of Beijing’s approach to Gui’s case, the Chinese government might 
ignore future pleas by other states to win even minimal access to their 
own nationals when they are detained inside China. 
Sweden’s efforts aside, one core question remains unanswered: 
why, after allowing Gui at least some small measure of freedom, would 
Chinese authorities decide to take him back into custody, especially in 
such dramatic fashion? Given the Chinese government’s tight-lipped 
approach to the case, it is impossible to know for sure. Gui’s contact 
with the Swedish consulate in Shanghai was almost certainly 
preapproved by the state security officials in charge of his case. They 
must have known that he was in touch with the Swedish consulate in 
order to renew his passport, and that his goal was to seek medical 
treatment abroad. Why, then, seek to block him from doing just that, 
after letting him take some initial steps toward leaving China? 
Perhaps those same officials started to have second thoughts. 
What if Gui somehow reached Europe, and decided to renew his 
publishing work once there? Or what if wrote a book of his own? No 
doubt he would have more than a few unsavory details to reveal about 
his kidnapping and two years in detention, including – if other, similar 
cases are any guide – denial of urgently needed medical care, threats 
against himself and his family, and possibly even physical abuse or 
torture. Given more time to think it all over, the officials handling Gui’s 
case might well have changed their minds: better to grab Gui again 
before potentially losing full physical control over him, than to risk the 
fallout from any revelations that might ensue once Gui reached Europe. 
 
feb/10/bookseller-gui-minhai-surfaces-in-chinese-custody-to-deliver-staged-confession 
[https://perma.cc/HLM3-KFBB]. 
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III. CONSULAR VISITATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR” or “the 
Convention”), which was adopted in 1963 by the UN Conference on 
Consular Relations, has justifiably been called “one of the more 
enduring and important treaties” of the post-War era.76 Over the more 
than fifty years since its adoption, the VCCR has achieved a high 
degree of recognition: 179 states have joined it, including China, the 
United States, Great Britain, and Sweden.77 The Convention is 
generally considered to be customary international law, which means 
that its provisions are binding on all states, even those few that have 
not yet ratified it.78 
 
A. Article 36: A Core International Law Norm  
 
Consular notification and visitation obligations are outlined under 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.79 Under 
Article 36, whenever a foreign national is detained within a state’s 
jurisdiction, state officials must inform the detained national of his 
right to consular notification and access.80 If the detained individual 
then requests consular assistance, the state is obligated to inform that 
national’s home government of the detention, and to facilitate consular 
access “without delay.”81 
The core goals of Article 36 are quite clear: it is meant to facilitate 
consular support to citizens detained overseas, while at the same time 
respecting a receiving state’s sovereignty over purely domestic 
criminal law matters.82 In part, Article 36 is prophylactic in nature: 
sending states hope that their official attention will ensure that their 
 
76.  John B. Quigley, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: In Retrospect and into 
the Future, 38 SOUTHERN ILL. U. L. J.  1 (2014) 1, 1.  
77. Depositary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/9WML-UG9Z] (last visited July 1, 2018). 
78. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at 25. 
79. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 22, art. 36.  
80.  See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at 139-185 (containing an excellent history of 
Article 36, and an authoritative analysis of states’ rights and obligations under that article). 
81. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 22, art. 36(1)(b). 
82. See ANNE JAMES, BRIDGING THE GAP: EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION OF FOREIGN 
NATIONALS IN US CRIMINAL CASES 15 (2007).  
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citizen’s case will be handled fairly and in accordance with the law, 
and that their citizens will not be mistreated if they are sentenced to 
prison.83 Article 36 also serves a humanitarian function, in that it allows 
for the provision of basic humanitarian assistance, including 
communication with the detained individual’s family and even the 
provision of basic life necessities such as food and medicine in 
circumstances where they are otherwise not provided.84 
Many states place a premium on consular support to their own 
nationals detained overseas and make very real efforts to offer 
whatever assistance they can to citizens who find themselves jailed in 
a foreign land.85 In its instructions to its consuls, for example, the US 
Department of State states that: “Our most important function as 
consular officers is to protect and assist U.S. citizens or nationals 
traveling or residing abroad. Few of our citizens need that assistance 
more than those who have been arrested in a foreign country or 
imprisoned in a foreign jail.”86 Other states have similarly stressed the 
importance of high-quality professional consular support to detained 
citizens.87 
For the most part, consular access is given to individuals accused 
of common crimes while abroad, including drug trafficking, disorderly 
conduct, and so on.88 In Europe, for example, crimes associated with 
football hooliganism have generated a huge number of detentions, 
which in turn led to the creation of a European Convention on Spectator 
Violence and Misbehavior at Sports Events, which complements the 
rights and obligations put forward in the Vienna Convention.89 In such 
cases, the political concerns that dominated the Gui Minhai case are 
more or less completely absent, making consular access much easier 
for the receiving state to execute. 
 
83. See id.  
84. See ANNE JAMES, A UNIVERSAL SAFEGUARD: PROVIDING CONSULAR ASSISTANCE 
TO NATIONALS IN CUSTODY: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE FOR CONSULATES 3 (2007). 
85. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at 147.  
86. See id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL AND HANDBOOK 
ON CONSULAR AFFAIRS: ARREST OF U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD 412 (2016)) 
87. See id. at 147-48. 
88. See id. at 139-40.  
89. See id. at 139.  
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Some states have concluded bilateral consular treaties that 
augment the provisions of the VCCR.90 Such treaties may include 
additional obligations as between the two contracting states that 
“extend or amplify” the existing provisions of the VCCR.91 States may, 
for example, opt to offer each other’s consular representatives 
additional privileges and immunities not listed in the VCCR.92 In their 
bilateral treaty, the United States and China set specific timelines for 
consular notification and visitation, adding specificity to the VCCR 
Article 36(1)(b) requirement that states be notified “without delay,” 
and a specific timeline to the general “right to visit” laid out by Article 
36(1)(c).93  
The VCCR is largely silent on the question of dual nationals. In 
many cases, individuals who are dual nationals may request and receive 
consular assistance from both states.94 If an individual is a national of 
both the sending and receiving state, the receiving state could choose 
to recognize the individual’s “predominant” nationality, and offer 
access if the individual’s predominant nationality is that of the sending 
state.95 In practice, however, many states, including both China and the 
United States, refuse consular protections to dual nationals who hold 
receiving state citizenship.96 
Though it may seem nothing more than a diplomatic formality, 
consular support can have a significant impact on the handling and 
outcome of a detained foreign national’s case.97 When they are 
 
90. See id. at 567-68. Many states concluded bilateral consular agreements before the 
VCCR went into force; under Article 73(1) of the Convention, those agreements generally 
remain valid. 
91. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 22, art. 73. Scholars generally 
agree that bilateral agreements that violate or restrict the VCCR would violate a state’s 
obligations under the Convention. 
92. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at 572-73. 
93. United States Consular Convention with the People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., 
Sept. 17, 1980. Under Article 35 of the Consular Convention, a state must be notified within 
four days of a national’s detention, and visitation must be granted within two days of 
notification. Id. Both states are guaranteed a minimum of one visit with detained nationals per 
month. Id.  
94. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at 126.  
95. See id. at 126-27. 
96. See generally Mark E. Wojcik, Consular Notification for Dual Nationals, 38 
SOUTHERN ILL. U. L. J. 73 (2013) (analyzing the US approach to its own dual nationals who are 
detained in the United States). 
97. See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the frameworks of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (serA) 
No. 16, 10 (Oct. 1, 1999) (noting that “[p]rompt consular assistance may be decisive in the 
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informed in a timely manner, consular officials can assist their 
nationals with the negotiation of linguistic and cultural barriers, help 
with the provision of a robust legal defense,98 raise concerns about 
allegations of torture or ill-treatment, and offer vital supports, such as 
messages from friends and family, that can help detainees make it 
through the mental and emotional rigors of a criminal trial.99 
Many of the key international controversies surrounding the 
VCCR have involved questions of remedies for failure to adhere to 
Article 36’s notification and access requirements. In three of the key 
Article 36 cases, Breard, Avena, and LaGrand, the United States has 
been pushed by other countries to provide remedies in cases in which 
local authorities have failed to notify detained individuals of their 
consular access rights, and have similarly failed to notify consular 
officials of the detention.100 For years, the United States largely ignored 
judgments from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) calling on the 
US to provide more robust remedies for Article 36 violations.101 
In recent years, more efforts have been made to bring the United 
States into compliance with international law as expressed in the ICJ 
verdicts, and to ensure better compliance with Article 36.102 In 2008, 
the Supreme Court held that the United States has an “international law 
obligation” to comply with the ICJ Avena verdict.103 Further, the Court 
 
outcome of a criminal proceeding, because it guarantees, inter alia, that the foreign detainee is 
advised of his constitutional and legal lights in his own language.”).  
98. See S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas’s Death Row and the Right 
of Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY’S L. J. 719, 722-30 (1995) (discussing that in the United 
States, for example, consular officials have worked with legal counsel to provide information 
on a foreign national’s life experience that in turn can be used as mitigating evidence in the 
penalty phase of a criminal trial). 
99. See KATERINA MANTOUVALOU, CONSULAR ASSISTANCE AND TRIAL ATTENDANCE, 
vii (2009).  
100. See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Case Concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Mar. 31); LaGrand 
Case (Ger. V. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466 (June 27).  
101. There is a vast literature on these cases, mostly centered on questions of domestic 
application of international law in the United States, and on the individual nature of the Article 
36 right. See generally William J. Aceves, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 97 AM.J. INT’L 
L. 923 (2003) (analyzing the Avena case); Carsten Hoppe, Implementation of LaGrand and 
Avena in Germany and the United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a 
Uniform Interpretation of Consular Rights,18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 317 (2007) (containing a rigorous 
critique of the US response to the ICJ verdicts).   
102. Interview with a U.S. Dep’t of State Official (Mar. 6, 2018).  
103. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008). That said, the Supreme Court held 
that the ICJ Avena verdict was not directly enforceable in the United States. Instead, the Court 
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held, the United States has a strong interest in implementing Avena, 
specifically “ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna 
Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and 
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law.”104 
In 2011, legislation was introduced to strengthen US compliance 
with Article 36, but, as of this writing, that bill – the Consular 
Notification Compliance Act – has yet to become law.105 That said, the 
US Department of State has strengthened its efforts to educate local 
police officials on the importance of adhering to notification and access 
requirements whenever a foreign national is detained.106 
In most cases in the US context, the violation of Article 36 was a 
product of failure at the local level, most likely because state and local 
authorities did not know that they were obligated to take action to 
execute their Article 36 responsibilities.107 Even as hundreds of cases 
of Article 36 violations have emerged over several years, the United 
States federal government has continued to reaffirm its Article 36 
obligations and has acknowledged violations when they have 
occurred.108 
In other words, US shortcomings in adherence to the Vienna 
Convention – serious though they are – differ from those committed by 
China in the Gui Minhai case. In Gui’s case, it seems clear that there 
was an overt (and ultimately largely successful) effort by the Chinese 
authorities to block Sweden and Gui’s exercise of their Vienna 
Convention rights. 
 
held, it should be enforced through implementing legislation passed by the United States 
Congress. See id. at 506.  
104. Id. at 524. 
105. See David Carle, Leahy Renews Effort to Bring U.S. Into Compliance With 
International Consular Notification Treaty, PATRICK LEAHY (June 14, 2011), 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-renews-effort-to-bring-us-into-compliance-with-
international-consular-notification-treaty [https://perma.cc/4WZQ-H7VG]. 
106. Interview with a U.S. Dep’t of State Official, supra note 102.  
107. Id. (according to the official, who was involved in outreach to state and local police 
departments, “No one willfully does not do it. That I have not found.”).  
108. See Bruce C. Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. and Counselor for Int’l Affairs, 
Meeting the United States’ International Law Obligations through the Consular Notification 
Compliance Act of 2011, Statement before the Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate (July 27, 
2011).  
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B. Article 36: Chinese State Practice 
When the VCCR was first promulgated in 1963, the People’s 
Republic of China was unable to join the treaty.109 It was locked out of 
the international system: the Republic of China represented China at 
the United Nations until 1971, despite the fact that it had been banished 
to Taiwan from the Mainland at the end of the Chinese civil war in 
1949.110 After the PRC took over the UN seat in 1971, it began a 
lengthy process of acceding to key treaties and joining other 
international organizations.111 China acceded to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations on July 2, 1979.112 
Around the same time, China also concluded bilateral consular 
conventions with a number of countries, often including provisions that 
closely mirrored the core provisions of the VCCR.113 The US-China 
Consular Convention was concluded in September 1980.114 China has 
since concluded some forty bilateral consular conventions, all of which 
further solidify its commitment to the norms and practices enunciated 
in the Vienna Convention.115 As of this writing, despite having 
concluded various other agreements on trade, cultural exchange, and 
other matters, China and Sweden have not concluded a bilateral 
consular agreement.116 
 
109. See SAMUEL S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 102-05 
(1979) (recounting the PRC’s successful drive to win the China UN seat). See generally Lincoln 
P. Bloomfield, China, the United States, and the United Nations, 20 INT’L ORG. 653 (1966) 
(containing an analysis of the factors that eventually led the United States to lead the charge 
against UN representation for the PRC). 
110. See KIM, supra note 109. 
111.  See ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND GLOBAL SECURITY, 33-64 (2007), (describing China’s re-integration into the international 
system).  
112. Stephen Kho, A Study of the Consular Convention Between the United States of 
America and the People’s Republic of China, 6 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN 
CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, 2 (1996).  
113. Table of Consular conventions and Agreements Between China and Foreign 
Countries, EMBASSY OF CHINA IN EST. (May 18, 2004), http://ee.china-embassy.org/eng/lsqw/
lsxx/t111172.htm [https://perma.cc/6W2X-DVW6] (containing a partial list of China’s consular 
agreements).  
114. See generally Kho, supra note 112 (providing an overview of  the U.S.-China 
Consular Convention). 
115. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at vii. 
116. See Bilateral Agreement between China and Sweden, ECON. AND COM. COUNS. OFF. 
OF THE EMBASSY OF CHINA IN SWEDEN (Feb. 27, 2007), http://se2.mofcom.gov.cn/
article/bilateralcooperation/bilateralagreement/200702/20070204406471.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/78ZT-22Y8] (containing a partial list of bilateral agreements between China 
and Sweden).  
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One early study of Chinese state practice regarding consular 
notification and access makes clear that the problems of delayed 
consular notification and insufficient access to detained foreign 
nationals, especially in politically sensitive cases, are longstanding 
ones.117 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese authorities 
repeatedly detained foreign nationals without informing their home 
governments.118 Some of these detained nationals were also blocked 
from meeting with diplomatic representatives after the country in 
question learned of the detention.119 
That said, at present, China largely adheres to its Article 36 
consular notification and access obligations. Several Beijing-based 
diplomats have confirmed that their cooperation with the Chinese 
authorities on Article 36 matters is generally robust and relatively 
smooth, though by no means fully problem-free.120 According to one 
Western diplomat based in Beijing, while consular authorities may not 
have access to a detained individual until formal notification takes 
place, nonetheless “they usually hit the 48 hour window.”121 Diplomats 
from other countries affirmed the Chinese government’s general 
promptness in notifying governments when their nationals are 
detained, and chalked up occasional shortcomings to a lack of 
understanding of notification requirements in more rural and isolated 
parts of China.122 
Diplomatic officials interviewed for this Article noted that 
Chinese officials often refuse to allow confidential consultations 
between detained foreign nationals and their consular representatives, 
and may even bring in a video camera to record conversations.123 In 
some cases, officials have restricted the topics that can be discussed 
during consular visits, disallowing conversation on pending legal 
matters.124 Though the Vienna Convention is silent on the question of 
confidential consultation with detained foreign nationals, nonetheless 
 
117. See generally Kho, supra note 112 (Kho’s study focuses on the detention of U.S. 
citizens, but it seems likely that other foreign nationals were held under circumstances that 
violated their consular notification and access rights as well). 
118. See generally id. (In some of the cases covered by Kho, the detained foreign nationals 
were engaged in more sensitive human rights or religious activities; in others, the individuals 
were engaged in run-of-the-mill commercial activities). 
119. Interviews. See generally id.  
120. Interview. 
121. Interview.  
122. Interviews. 
123. Interviews. 
124. Interviews.  
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some states to urge their consular officials to request private and 
confidential visits.125 
It should be noted that China does not uniformly hinder consular 
notification and access in all politically sensitive cases. Indeed, more 
often than not, Chinese officials will allow consular access, even 
despite the political sensitivities surrounding a particular case.126 For 
example: Peter Humphrey, a British business consultant who was 
detained in Shanghai in July 2013 over allegedly illegally acquiring 
personal information, notes that the British consular officials who 
visited him regularly were his “angels.”127 US citizen Sandy Phan 
Gillis, who was detained in March 2015 on alleged espionage charges, 
also received regular visits from US consular officials.128 Canadian 
citizens Kevin and Julia Garratt, detained in the northeastern city of 
Dandong in August 2014, also on allegations of espionage, were 
similarly allowed regular access to Canadian consular officials.129 
These are but a few of many such examples of sensitive cases in which 
consular access rights – if not, unfortunately, basic criminal due 
process rights – were largely adhered to. 
In that sense, the cases that are the focus of this article – including 
the Gui Minhai case – are outliers. Unlike most foreigners who are 
detained in China, Gui, Lee Bo, Xue Feng, and Peter Dahlin were not 
granted immediate access to consular officials. Even more troublingly, 
Gui and Lee may have been pressured to renounce their Swedish and 
British passports, as a means of nullifying their and their countries’ 
rights under the Vienna Convention. 
Even extremely rich and powerful businesspeople – including 
mainland-born Chinese who have taken up foreign citizenship – are not 
 
125. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 16, at 150-51.  
126. Interviews. As one US-based NGO expert on detentions of U.S. citizens put it, 
“generally speaking, if you are an American citizen, they will grant you consular access.” Id. 
The same seems to hold true for citizens of other countries as well. 
127. Peter Humphrey, ‘I was locked inside a steel cage’: Peter Humphrey on his life inside 
a Chinese prison, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/db8b9e36-1119-
11e8-940e-08320fc2a277 [https://perma.cc/YK8X-8EF2].  
128. China charges U.S. woman with espionage, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016, 6:41 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-usa/china-charges-u-s-woman-with-espionage-
idUSKCN115159 [https://perma.cc/U2AC-3H8K]. 
129. Michelle Zillio, Kevin Garratt makes first public appearance after release from 
Chinese prison, GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/canadian-detained-in-china-makes-first-public-appearance-since-
release/article32285150/ [https://perma.cc/Y6XH-MVB3].    
2018] THE GUI MINHAI CASE 1237 
immune to potential violations of their Vienna Convention rights.130 In 
late January 2017, prominent billionaire businessman Xiao Jianhua 
was abducted from the Four Seasons Hotel in Hong Kong and was 
taken over the border into China.131 Various sources have reported that 
Xiao is not in detention, and in fact is merely “helping” Chinese 
authorities with various anti-corruption investigations.132 This claim 
has been met with skepticism by some, who have pointed to the strange 
circumstances surrounding Xiao’s departure from Hong Kong as 
evidence that he was forcibly abducted, and is not willingly cooperating 
with Chinese authorities.133 As far as is known, Xiao has not been able 
to meet with Canadian consular officials, despite the fact that he has 
held Canadian citizenship for over a decade.134 
Peter Dahlin’s case aside, there is an unmistakable racial 
component to Beijing’s approach to an individual’s VCCR rights. The 
cases of Gui, Lee, Xue, and Xiao have raised concerns among many 
Chinese-born individuals who have obtained foreign citizenship that 
the Chinese government will simply ignore the foreign passports – and 
the rights that come with them – of ethnically Chinese individuals who 
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are detained in China.135 Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s 2016 statement 
that Lee Bo is “first and foremost Chinese” was an apt encapsulation 
of this point of view.136 
Still, it seems clear that China is taking steps to block certain key 
individuals from accessing consular representatives, in violation of 
international law. In addition, it seems highly likely that, in some cases, 
the Chinese government has used detained individuals themselves to 
frustrate the underlying goals of VCCR Article 36. 
If so, then China has found a new and innovative way to evade its 
Article 36 obligations. This Author was unable to identify any other 
instances of detained foreign nationals being forced to publicly 
renounce consular assistance or their own foreign nationality.137 As 
noted above, both the United States and other countries have fallen 
short at times in terms of their own adherence to Article 36. But for the 
most part, those instances of failure were due to low-level bureaucratic 
shortcomings, and not to an active effort, sustained over a period of 
years in at least two cases, to strip an individual of his consular 
assistance rights. 
The fact that China has found a new way to evade its VCCR 
Article 36 commitments is a deeply disturbing example of Beijing’s at 
times instrumentalist approach to its obligations under international 
law. As one prominent American scholar of China has put it: “China 
continues to display and practice a distinct ‘transactional’ style of 
diplomacy, carefully weighing national costs and benefits, rather than 
contributing to global collective ‘public goods.’”138 
Sadly, it seems clear that the PRC government has yet to fully 
internalize the values that underlie the Vienna Convention, and is 
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willing to jettison those core values when China’s perceived state 
interests so require.139 This approach fits in with China’s broader 
approach to its international law obligations, in which China generally 
“obeyed most international rules and norms, [and yet] its compliance 
was selective and shallow.”140 
If so, such an interest-based approach is incredibly short-sighted: 
after all, hundreds of millions of Chinese nationals travel overseas 
every year, to study, to do business, or for tourism.141 Some take up 
residence in foreign countries for years at a time before eventually 
deciding to return to China. If and when its own citizens get into trouble 
while abroad, China will expect prompt notification of their arrest, and 
seek a reasonable level of access to them while in detention. In other 
words, China enjoys the reciprocal rights that are protected by the 
Vienna Convention, and should therefore seek to strengthen the VCCR 
through its own rigorous compliance with its core provisions. At least 
in the key cases documented in this Article, the Chinese government 
has allowed domestic political concerns to override the benefits of 
compliance. 
IV. CONCLUSION: STATUS QUO OR REVISIONIST POWER? 
In recent years, a debate has raged over China’s approach to 
international law, and its future aspirations for influence within the 
international system.142 As China grows more wealthy and powerful, 
would Beijing more actively support the existing United States-led 
international order, or would it seek to reshape key institutions and 
norms to better suit its own interests? 
Those arguing in favor of viewing China as a status quo power, 
one that would support the existing set of rules and norms, had more 
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than a few points to make in favor of their point of view: after all, few 
countries have benefited as much as China has from the existing 
order.143 At the same time, given the significant role that economic 
growth plays in legitimating one-Party rule in China, few countries 
would have as much to lose if a breakdown in the international order 
led to increased regional tensions, which in turn caused an economic 
downturn. Better for China to stick with the existing system, the 
argument goes, rather than risk the instability that might ensue were it 
to take steps to undermine that system. 
To be sure, China has taken a number of important steps to support 
the existing liberal order. After years of dragging its feet, China has 
become a key supporter of international efforts to combat climate 
change, for example. In fact, the Chinese government’s diplomatic 
efforts helped to push the Paris Agreement on Climate Change over the 
finish line. Though China’s record on trade is far from perfect, it has 
largely sought to handle trade disputes through the WTO dispute 
resolution mechanism, rather than taking unilateral action outside the 
bounds of the WTO. And China has, at times, played a constructive 
role in international efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
development program. 
At the same time, any discussion of China’s approach to 
international institutions and international law takes place against a 
backdrop of rapidly declining US government support for the world 
order that it did so much to create.144 In his first year in office, President 
Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement, 
pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership regional free trade 
agreement, and has threatened to take the United States out of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. He has repeatedly ridiculed key 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, deriding them as “free 
riders.” And his administration abandoned the United States’ seat on 
the UN Human Rights Council, a body that President Trump himself 
termed an “embarrassment.”145 
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Most supporters of the liberal international order believe that the 
system will be resilient enough to survive the leadership vacuum 
created by the Trump presidency.146 But the fact remains that US 
government criticism of Chinese violations of international law is 
undermined by Washington’s own recent actions. 
For its part, China has taken several steps that have undermined 
the effectiveness of international law and international institutions. In 
July 2016, Beijing publicly rejected an important verdict on the South 
China Sea, and has continued to take steps, many considered by 
international law experts to be illegal, to strengthen its hold over 
international waters there.147 China and Russia have both blocked 
various UN Security Council resolutions meant to deal with the crisis 
in Syria, including a 2014 resolution that would have referred the 
Syrian conflict to the International Criminal Court.148 And China has 
taken several steps over the past two decades to undermine the 
effectiveness of UN human rights bodies, so as to avoid being censured 
by the international community for serious and ongoing violations of 
core civil and political rights.149 
No doubt, any final analysis of China’s approach to international 
law and politics will more heavily weigh its higher-profile 
contributions and shortcomings.150 But for any state, strict adherence 
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to many of the fundamental rules that underlie the day-to-day conduct 
of international life is a key measuring stick. The Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, now more than a half-century old, codifies basic 
and absolutely vital customary international law norms.151 China’s 
failure to adhere to its obligations under Article 36 – even in just a small 
handful of high-profile cases – adds to the growing concern among 
members of the international community that China might try to change 
the international rules of the game in ways that suit its own interests. 
The jury is still out on whether China is a revisionist or a status quo 
power. Still, the Gui Minhai case and others like it are a painful 
reminder that China has not yet fully adopted and internalized key 
liberal international norms and values. 
What should the international community do about Beijing’s 
failure to fully adhere to its VCCR obligations? A key lesson of the Gui 
Minhai case is that perhaps only sustained public pressure – of the sort 
that Sweden initially failed to bring to bear in Gui’s case – will change 
China’s interest-based calculus in any given case. Private diplomacy, 
while no doubt an important part of any country’s diplomatic toolkit, 
will likely not be enough to generate a positive Chinese response. 
Similarly, arguments that rely too heavily on China’s legal obligations, 
or on the liberal values that underlie the Vienna Convention, may also 
fail to sway Chinese decision-makers.152 
At the end of the day, there is no easy solution to the problem of 
Chinese non-compliance with VCCR Article 36 in cases that are 
deemed politically sensitive. States seeking access to their detained 
nationals who are in custody in China should keep in mind that their 
Chinese counterparts are paying ever more attention to the dictates of 
domestic politics, and less to the rules and norms of international law. 
Sadly, in Xi Jinping’s China, when the two are in conflict, it may be 
difficult for international law to prevail. 
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